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ARTICLES

THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION TO RECOGNIZE A
PSYCHOTHERAPIST PRIVILEGE IN JAFFEE v. REDMOND,
116 S. CT. 1923 (1996): THE MEANING OF "EXPERIENCE"
AND THE ROLE OF "REASON" UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 501
Diane Marie Amann* and Edward j Imwinkelried**
Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itself is nothing else
but reason ....
Sir Edward Coke'
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 2
The rationalist tradition is one of the foremost schools of common-law jurisprudence. 3 Lord Coke, an early spokesperson for
that school, argued that a court could formulate common-law
doctrine relying on "nothing else but reason." 4 Eventually, a
competing school, the legal realist tradition, emerged. 5 Justice
Holmes was one of the seminal thinkers in that camp. He borrowed Coke's expression, "the life of the law," but used it to advance the radically different premise that the vital common-law
principle is "experience," not "reason." 6 On common-law doctrine, Holmes wrote that "a page of history is worth a volume of
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(1985).
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4. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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logic." 7
A strict adherent to either jurisprudential school would be perplexed by Federal Rule of Evidence 501. In pertinent part, that
statute reads:
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. 8
The final three words, "reason and experience," 9 comprise the
critical passage. The passage appears to confound both schools
because it mandates that the courts developing federal privilege
doctrine grant reason and experience equal weight.
In practice, reason has prevailed at the lower court level. The
federal district courts and courts of appeals have exercised their
power under Rule 501 quite cautiously. 0 True to the rationalist
tradition, these courts, for the most part, have attached the highest priority to "[r]ectitude of decision (i.e. the correct application of ... substantive laws to facts established as true)." n When
rectitude of decision has collided "with other values such as . . .
the protection of [allegedly privileged] relationships,"'1 2 the
courts ordinarily have resolved the conflict against the litigant
who claimed a privilege that would block admission of logically
relevant evidence. Several courts have erected "a strong presumption" against fashioning new privileges. 13 Prior to 1996,
some even went so far as to hold that Rule 501 precludes the
courts from recognizing privileges that did not exist at common
14
law before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Until 1996, the United States Supreme Court exhibited the
same resistance to arguments in favor of creating new privileges.
The Court had declared that "[e]videntiary privileges in litiga7. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
8. FED. R. Evrn. 501.

9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Miller v. Transamerican
Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980).
11. WILLIAM TWINING, supra note 3, at 14.

12. Id.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 176 (1994). See also Daniel Capra, The Federal Law of Privileges, 16 LrIG. 32
(Fall 1989).
14. See Capra, supra note 13, at 35 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d
562 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 906 (1989)).
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tion are not favored." 15 Appreciating that privileges obstruct the
search for truth, the Court opined that the recognition of a new
privilege is warranted only when the privilege would serve a
"public good" of such magnitude that it "transcend[s] the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means [for]
ascertaining truth." 16 In the famous Nixon case, 7 the Court emphasized that testimonial privileges "are not lightly created nor
expansively construed." In a long line of cases, the Court consistently rejected the invitation to announce the existence of new,
18
uncodified privileges.
Given that unbroken line of authority, the Supreme Court's
1996 decision in Jaffee v. Redmond 9 came as a mild surprise. In
that case, the majority not only held, despite scant case-law support,20 that communications within the psychotherapist-patient
relationship are privileged, but it also accorded the privilege
broad scope. This breadth is evidenced by the majority's rulings
that create an absolute rather than a conditional privilege 21 and
that extend the privilege to conversations with licensed clinical
social workers. 22
The majority issued these decisions over a vigorous dissent by
Justice Scalia.3 Justice Scalia faulted both the majority's threshold recognition of a psychotherapist privilege and its extension
of the privilege to licensed clinical social workers. Initially, Justice Scalia listed the leading cases in the line of authority that
vindicated the "traditional judicial preference for the truth"24 by
rejecting novel privilege claims. Although he acknowledged that
"psychotherapist privilege statutes exist in all the states," 25 he did
not consider that fact to be "experience" in favor of recognizing
a psychotherapist privilege. In his judgment, those statutes were
15. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979).
16. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
17. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
18. See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (privilege
for academic peer review); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980) (privilege
against disclosure of legislative acts by state legislator); United States v. Arthur Young &
Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984) (accountant-client privilege).
19. 116 S. CL 1923 (1996).
20. See id. at 1927, 1935-36 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. See id. at 1932.
22. See id. at 1931-32.
23. See id. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 1935 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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beside the point because that body of law "consists entirely of
26
legislation rather than common-law decision."
Likewise, Justice Scalia criticized the majority's decision to include social workers within the ambit of the privilege. He noted
the differences between psychiatrists and psychologists, on the
one hand, and social workers, on the other.27 The former possess
much more expertise in the treatment of mental illness 28 and, in
Justice Scalia's opinion, consequently deserve the protection of
an evidentiary privilege far more than the latter. Because the
training of clinical social workers is not "comparable in its
rigor, '29 the majority's decision to treat social workers in the
same fashion as psychiatrists and psychologists struck Justice
30
Scalia as "irresponsible."
The thesis of this Article is that, notwithstanding the forceful
character of Justice Scalia's dissent, the Jaffee majority came to
the right result. Part I of this Article describes, in detail, both
the lower court and the Supreme Court opinions in Jaffee. Part II
of this Article evaluates Justice Scalia's argument that, under
Rule 501, there should be a strong, general preference against
recognizing new privileges. This Article concludes that Justice
Scalia is right on this score as a matter of both policy and statutory construction. Part III of this Article turns to the specific
question of whether federal courts applying Rule 501 should
have recognized a psychotherapist privilege and extended it to
clinical workers. This Article concludes that the Jaffee majority
has the better of the argument. Properly interpreted, "experience" cuts in favor of fashioning a psychotherapist privilege.
"Reason," meanwhile, justifies the majority's ruling that, in a
democratic society committed to the principle of equality, the
privilege should reach psychological counseling by social workers. As Part III explains, the Jaffee majority's holdings are not
only defensible, but more importantly, the holdings shed light
on the meaning of the expressions "experience" and "reason" in
Rule 501.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 1938 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
See id. at 1937 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 1938 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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A DESCRIPTION OF THE LOWER COURT DECISIONS AND SUPREME
COURT OPINIONS IN THE JAFME CASE

A.

The District Court Decision

The catalyst for the Jaffee decision was a civil rights action filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.31 The plaintiffs were the survivors of
Ricky Allen, Sr. Allen passed away after being shot by Mary Lu
Redmond, a police officer employed by the Village of Hoffman
Estates, Illinois. Redmond and the village were named as defendants in the plaintiffs' complaint, which alleged that in the encounter leading to the shooting, Redmond had used excessive
force.
During pretrial discovery, the plaintiffs learned that Redmond
had participated in approximately fifty counseling sessions with
Karen Beyer, a licensed clinical social worker employed by the
Village of Hoffman Estates. 32 To prepare to cross-examine Redmond, the plaintiffs attempted to obtain Beyer's notes of the
counseling sessions. Both defendants resisted discovery on the
ground that a common-law psychotherapist-patient privilege pro33
tected the notes.
The district court judge rejected the defendants' argument.
Nevertheless, both during depositions and on the witness stand
at trial, the defendants invoked the privilege to refuse to answer
certain questions. 34 In the final jury charge, the trial judge informed the jurors that they were permitted to draw an "adverse
inference" from the defendants' refusal: 35 "[T]he judge advised
the jury that the refusal to turn over Beyer's notes had no 'legal
justification' and that the jury could therefore presume that the
contents of the notes would have been unfavorable to" defendants. 36 The jury returned a verdict exceeding $500,000 in favor of
37
the plaintiffs.

B.

The Court of Appeals Decision

The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sev31. See id. at 1925-26.
32. See id. at 1926..

33. See id.
34.
35.
(1996).
36.
37.

See id.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1354 (7th Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1923
Jffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926.
See id.
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enth Circuit. 38 The court of appeals reversed the trial court judgment. At the outset of its opinion, the court decided to recognize a psychotherapist privilege. The court noted that the other
circuits had split over the question of the wisdom of recognizing
the privilege.3 9 Indeed, the court frankly conceded that the majority of the relevant published opinions had answered the question in the negative. 40Yet, the court chose to embrace the minority view and presented two very different arguments to justify its
choice.
The first argument was humanistic in nature. Concerned with
matters intrinsic to the litigants, humanistic rationales "treat privileges as corollaries to the rights to privacy and personal autonomy."41 The Seventh Circuit evoked this humanistic rationale in
this quote from an earlier decision creating a psychotherapist
privilege: " 'The psychiatric patient ... exposes to the therapist
not only what his words directly express; he lays bare his entire
self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame.' "42 The
court proceeded to cite numerous precedents establishing privacy zones that reinforce "personal autonomy." 43 In "the American legal tradition," the court wrote, the protection of privacy is
a legitimate "end in itself.""4
The second argument was instrumental. Focusing on extrinsic
concerns, instrumental, or utilitarian, rationales "argue that privileges should be recognized as a means to the end of promoting
certain types of out-of-court conduct." 45 The Seventh Circuit's
end was to establish a privilege that would foster candid patientpsychotherapist consultation. The court observed that, during
counseling, patients often divulge "highly personal matters," public revelation of which "would ... be embarrassing to the point

38. SeeJaffee, 51 E3d at 1346.
39. See id. at 1354-55.
40. Although the Second and Sixth Circuits had opted for the privilege, the Fifth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits were contra. See id. at 1354-55.
41. Edward J. Irwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73
NEB. L. REV. 511, 543-44 (1994) (hereinafter cited as Imwinkelried, An Hegelian
Approach).

42. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1356 (quoting In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 638 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983)).
43. See id. (quoting, inter alia, a passage from Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965), that explains a constitutional basis for zones of privacy).

44. Id.
45. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach, supra note 41, at 543.

19971

JAFFEE V REDMOND

1025

of mortification."4 The court reasoned that without an "assurance" of confidentiality, the patients may balk at disclosing their
"innermost thoughts," 47 and without such disclosures, the psychotherapist could not effectively diagnose and treat patients. The
court drew support for its own reasoning from "the fact that all
fifty states have recognized the need for and have adopted vary4
ing forms of the psychotherapist-patient privilege." 8
After deciding to recognize a privilege, the court turned to the
issue of the privilege's scope. Although it acknowledged that
Beyer was a clinical social worker rather than a psychiatrist or
psychologist, 49 the court refused to draw the line between the
two categories of counselors: "Drawing a distinction between the
counseling provided by costly psychotherapists and the counseling provided by more readily accessible social workers serves no
discernible public purpose. Indeed, social workers have been
characterized as the 'poor person's psychiatrist.' "50
Finally, the court addressed whether the new privilege would
be absolute or conditional. Absolute privileges can be defeated
only by establishing the holder's waiver or the applicability of a.
special exception 5l-not by a showing of compelling need for the
information. 52 A party seeking disclosure may surmount a condi53
tional privilege, however, by demonstrating a compelling need.
Regarding this last issue, the Seventh Circuit, which had boldly
recognized a psychotherapeutic privilege encompassing social
workers, assumed a conservative stance. It fashioned a limited,
conditional privilege, requiring the trial judge to assess "whether,
in the interests of justice, the evidentiary need for the disclosure
of the contents of a patient's counseling sessions outweighs that
patient's privacy interests."14
The court held that the facts in Jaffee weighed in favor of sustaining the defendants' privilege claim. The court observed that
the plaintiffs had little need for Beyer's notes because "[t]here

46. Jaffee, 51 E3d at 1356 (citing In 7e Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992)).
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 1357-58.
50. See id. at 1358 n.19.
51. See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL, EVIDENCE IN THE NINTiEs 746-51 (3d ed. 1991).
52. See Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Ariz., 881 F.2d
1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989).
53. See CARLsoN, supra note 51, at 751.
54. Jaffee, 51 E3d at 1357.
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were numerous eyewitnesses to the shooting."55 In contrast, the
privacy interests of Officer Redmond, who had "sought professional counseling after an unquestionably traumatic and tragic
56
event she experienced in the line of duty," were "substantial."
Concluding that these privacy interests trumped the plaintiffs'
need, the court held that the trial judge had erred in permitting
adverse comment on the defendants' refusal to surrender Beyer's
notes.
C. The Supreme Court Opinions

1. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, affirmed the
result and most of the rulings of the Seventh Circuit. On' the
threshold question of whether to recognize any psychotherapist
privilege, the majority opinion concurred with the Seventh Circuit. Essentially ignoring the humanistic argument articulated by
the Seventh Circuit, the majority instead adopted and elaborated
on the circuit court's instrumental rationale. "If the privilege
were rejected," the majority wrote, "confidential conversations
between psychotherapists and their patients would surely be chilled."5 T To underscore its own reasoning that such a chill would
disserve societal goals, the majority, as did the Seventh Circuit,
observed that "all 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist privilege."58
Although the majority asserted that both "reason" and "experience" favored its conclusion,5 9 its argument relied primarily on
the latter. The majority insisted that reliance upon legislative experience as a basis for exercising the judicial power codified in
Rule 501 was entirely "appropriate. "60 According to Justice Stevens, the legislative experience is pertinent "[b] ecause state legislatures are fully aware of the need to protect the integrity of the
factfinding functions of their courts." 61 Consequently, "[i]t is of
no consequence that recognition of the privilege in the vast majority of States is the product of legislative action rather than ju55. Id. at 1358.

56. Id.
57. Jaffee, 116 S. CL at 1929.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 1930.

60. See id.
61. Id.
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dicial decision." 62 "The present unanimous acceptance of the

privilege" by "state lawmakers" is persuasive proof of a solid sorelationship
cial "consensus" that the psychotherapist-patient
63
merits the protection of an evidentiary privilege.
Next, the majority considered the nature of the privilege.
Whereas its threshold ruling had rebuffed the trial judge's refusal to recognize any privilege, its ruling on the nature of the
privilege rejected the Seventh Circuit's recognition of only a con64
ditional privilege, superable by a showing of compelling need.
Justice Stevens declared for the majority:
We part company with the Court of Appeals on [this] point.
We reject the balancing component of the privilege implemented by that court and a small number of States. Making the
promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later
evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest in
privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate
the effectiveness of the privilege. .

.

. [I]f the purpose of the

privilege is to be served, the participants in the confidential
conversation 'must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but reby the courts, is little better
sults in widely varying applications
65
than no privilege at all.'

Finally, the majority issued the ruling that drew the sharpest
fire from Justice Scalia-its decision to affirm the Seventh Circuit's extension of the privilege to conversations with licensed
clinical social workers. The majority not only approved the result
reached by the circuit court, but it also endorsed the circuit
court's reasoning. The majority observed that "[t]oday, social
workers provide a significant amount of mental health treatment." 66 The majority added that social workers' "clients often
include the poor and those of modest means who could not afford the assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist . . . but
whose counseling sessions serve the same . . . goals." 67 The ma-

jority approvingly quoted the Seventh Circuit's statement that to
differentiate clinical social workers from psychiatrists would serve
62.
63.
64.
65.
(1981)).
66.
67.

Id.
See id.
SeeJaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357.
Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 (quoting Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393
Id. at 1931.
Id.
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... purpose" or reason. 61
2.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Scalia filed the only dissenting opinion in Jaffee,69 although the Chief Justice joined in the part of the dissent that attacked the extension of the privilege to social workers. 70 In his
dissent, Justice Scalia ignored the question of whether the privilege should be absolute or conditional. Instead, he directed his
criticism to the majority's rulings that recognized any privilege at
all and that expanded the scope of the privilege to apply to social workers.
Justice Scalia prefaced his criticism with a detailed review of
Supreme Court precedents that expressed hostility to the creation or extension of evidentiary privileges. 71 The common denominator of these "extensive" 72 precedents, he wrote, was that
they all vindicated the "traditional judicial preference for the
truth."7 3 With that preference in mind, Justice Scalia launched
into his criticism of the majority rulings.
The key to Justice Scalia's critiques of both the threshold recognition of a psychotherapeutic privilege and its extension to social workers was his interpretation of the term "experience" in
Federal Rule of Evidence 501. Construing the term to mean judicial experience, justice Scalia bluntly stated that he considered
the " 'experience' of the States ... irrelevant ... because it con74
sists entirely of legislation rather than common-law decision."
The statutes were irrelevant because their very existence "[a]t
best... suggests that the matter has been found not to lend itself to judicial treatment. 75 On a more skeptical note, Justice
Scalia contended that the statutory form of the state privileges
"[a] t worst .. . suggests that the privilege commends itself only
to decisionmaking bodies in which reason is tempered ... by po68. See id. at 1932.
69. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 1932. The Chief Justice indicated that he joined "as to Part III" of the
dissent. That part of the dissent deals with the question of whether the privilege should
reach conversations with licensed clinical social workers. See id. at 1936 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

71. See id. at 1932-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1940 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 1938 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The paragraph immediately following again
refers to "the irrelevance" of the state statutes. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1936 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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litical pressure from organized interest groups." 76
Justice Scalia also challenged the wisdom of the majority's decision to expand the scope of the privilege to protect licensed
clinical social workers. Citing the pertinent Illinois statutes, 77 Justice Scalia asserted that even licensed social workers lack the "significantly heightened degree of skill" that is the hallmark of psychiatrists and psychologists.7 8 The social workers' education and
experience are not as precisely tailored to the treatment of
mental illness.7 9 The differences between social workers and fullfledged mental health experts are so pronounced that, in Justice
Scalia's view, the confidentiality of social workers' counseling is
not worth "purchas[ing] at the price of occasional injustice."8 0 At
the very end of his dissent, Justice Scalia insisted that the minimal benefit "of encouraging psychotherapy by social workers"
did not make it "tolerable" to convert the federal courts into
"tools of injustice."81

II. AN

EVALUATION OF

JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONTENTION THAT UNDER

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE

501, THERE SHOULD BE A GENERAL

BIAS AGAINST CREATING NEW PRIVILEGES OR EXPANDING EXISTING

PRIVILEGES
Before setting out his critique of the Jaffee majority's specific
rulings, Justice Scalia developed his general position that there
should be a strong bias against the enforcement of evidentiary
82
rules that interfere with the rational "pursuit of the truth."
Given that bias, the courts should ordinarily "reject new privi-

leges .

.

. and .

.

. construe narrowly the scope of existing privi-

leges."8 3 Justice Scalia's stance on this issue is sound. Indeed, his
position is stronger than he makes it out to be. Although he
seemed content to marshal the earlier Supreme Court precedents that support his policy-based position, 4 the position could
have been strengthened by a powerful statutory construction
argument.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
See
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

(Scalia, J., dissenting).
id. at 1937 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1937 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
id. at 1938 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1937 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1941 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1940 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
id. at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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It certainly is hard to dispute Justice Scalia's thesis that as a
matter of general policy, courts should hesitate to adopt "rule[s]
which exclud[e] reliable and probative evidence."8 5 Public judicial systems exist in large part to reduce the danger that aggrieved parties will resort to private, violent means of dispute resolution.8 6 If the system consistently produces accurate
outcomes-verdicts determined by the correct application of legal norms to the facts-the outcomes will tend to inspire public
confidence in the system. The system will be accepted as legitimate,87 and the general public will be inclined to respect and to
obey judgments rendered by the system. If an evidentiary rule
obstructs the system's search for truth, however, the outcome
might represent a substantive injustice.88 Even worse, as Justice
Scalia argued in his dissent in Jaffee, the court decreeing the outcome might be perceived as an "instrumen[t] of wrong."8 9 If
such outcomes become more than "occasional" 90 aberrations, the
system itself may eventually become "unpalatable for those who
love justice." 91
Although Justice Scalia presented a policy argument that is
powerful as well as sound, he strangely overlooked a statutory
construction argument that would have reinforced his position.
Perhaps this is because although he recognized that the Court in
Jaffee did not write "on a clean slate," 92 Justice Scalia failed to examine what was on the slate; namely, Federal Rule of Evidence
501.93 In enacting Rule 501, Congress set forth the means for
evolution of federal privilege law. Thus, the question was not
whether, as a matter of general evidentiary policy, the Court
thought it advisable to recognize a psychotherapist privilege.
Rather, the precise question was one of statutory interpretation:
Is recognition of a psychotherapist privilege a proper exercise of
the power that Congress delegated to the federal courts in Rule

85. Id. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On JudicialProofand the Acceptability
of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L.REv. 1357 (1985).
87. See Dolf Sternberger, Legitimacy, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 244, 247 (David Sills ed., 1968) (discussing the contributions of Max Weber, Carl

Schmitt, and Guglielmo Ferrero to the sociological concept of legitimacy).
88. See Jaffee, 116 S.Ct. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 1932.
91. Id. at 1933.
92. Id. at 1940.
93. See FED. R EVID. 501.
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501?14
The text of Rule 501, standing alone, does not answer the
question. The first sentence of Rule 501 directs federal courts to
determine privilege questions by resorting to "the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted . . . in the light of

reason and experience." 95 The word "principle" ordinarily denotes a broader proposition than a particularized rule.9 6 Con-

gress's use of the term "principles" in Rule 501 attains more significance because, in bther provisions in the same statutory
scheme, Congress employed the narrower term "rule."9 When a
legislature utilizes different words, ,itmay be assumed that the
legislature had different things in mind.98
The expression in Rule 501, "principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experi-

ence," is usually attributed to 1930s Supreme Court decisions,
Funk v. United States" and Wolfle v. United States.1° In Funk in particular, the Court made it clear that the expression denoted no
specific set of evidentiary propositions, but rather a common-law
methodology by which courts balanced the need for evidence
against the benefit of cloaking a relationship with a privilege.101
Within years, Congress itself "confirmed" the Funk-Wofle methodology by enacting Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26, which
directs courts "to determine admissibility of evidence under the
'principles of the common law as they may be interpreted.. . in
the light of reason and experience.' "102 The legislative history of
Rule 501 demonstrates an intent to maintain this reading of the
statutory expression. In his testimony before Congress, the late
Professor David Louisell, one of the leading American authorities
94. See 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 5422, 5425 (1980).

95. FED. R. EVID. 501.
96. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977).
97. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 402.
98. See Florida Public Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC, 54 F.3d 857 (D.C. Cir.
1995); United States v. Barial, 31 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Taracorp, Inc. v.
NL Indus., Inc., 73 E3d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying the same maxim to the interpretation of a contract).
99. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
100. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
101. See Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach, supra note 41, at 541.
102. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 76-77 (1958) (quoting rule); Cf.JACK B.
WEINSTEIN ET AL., 3 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 1 501.0212] [a), at 501-6 to -7 (Joseph
M. McLaughlin, gen. ed., 1997) (noting that the language of Rule 501 also appears in
FED. R. CRIM. P. 26); 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER. FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 201, at 646 (1985) (Rule 26 based on Wokl and Funk).
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on privilege law, entreated Congress to authorize the courts to
employ "the common law evolutionary method." 13 Likewise, the
Senate committee report stated that Rule 501 was intended to
t °4
permit the development of "evolved" privilege rules.
The text of Rule 501 furnishes the basic methodology, but suggests no preference in the adjudication of privilege claims. The
Supreme Court has often 1 remarked that "the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context . ... 106The interpretation of a word in a statutory scheme is a "holistic endeavor," t°7 and the meaning of one provision in the scheme can
shed valuable light on the interpretation of another provision.
Examining Rule 501 in the context of its statutory scheme-the
Federal Rules of Evidence-dictates the very preference Justice
Scalia urged: a bias against creating new privileges or expanding
old privileges.
Numerous provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence manifest a bias in favor of the admission of logically relevant evi0
108
dence. There are provisions in Articles IV, V1,109 VII,1 VJI,111

and X113 that lower common-law barriers to the introduction of relevant evidence. The policy bias in favor of admitting
relevant evidence is both evident and purposeful; indeed, on several occasions, the Supreme Court has acknowledged it. In 1988,
in its decision in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,11 4 the Court referred to the "liberal thrust of the Federal Rules."" 5 In the same
opinion, the Court alluded to the Federal Rules of Evidence's
"general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers" to the admission of evidence. In 1993, the Court repeated similar generalizations in its celebrated scientific evidence decision, Daubert v.
IX, 112

103. PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE (SuPP.): HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICARY, 93d Cong. 242 (1973).

104. See S. Rep. No. 93-1277, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051.
105. See United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc.,
508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993) ("[o]ver and over").

106. King v. Saint Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991).
107. United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass'ns, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988).
108. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach, supra note 41, at 537-38.
109. See id. at 538.
110. See id. at 538-39.
111. See id. at 539.
112. See id. at 539-40.
113. See id. at 540.

114. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
115. Id. at 169.
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Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 6 The Court in Daubert approvingly cited the quoted language in Rainey17 and added that the
Rules have a "permissive" 18 character.
As the Court commented in Daubert, these provisions form a
general "backdrop" for resolving ambiguities in individual statutes in the Federal Rules of Evidence.119 Given that backdrop,
Rule 501 should be construed as embodying the general preference that Justice Scalia championed:
Although Rule 501 furnishes the procedural methodology for
adjudicating privilege claims, its context-the other articles of
the Federal Rules-supplies a substantive policy bias favoring
the admission of relevant, reliable evidence. The invocation of
a privilege can bar the introduction of such evidence, and the
loss of that evidence is the social cost of recognizing the privilege. The Federal Rules of Evidence have a built-in bias against
that type of loss.... [T]hat bias does not derive from the legislative history of Rule 501 itself; rather, it emanates from Rule
501's neighbors, Articles IV and VI through X. Rule 501 in effect requires the judge to weigh the competing interests on a
scale; but Congress has placed a thumb on the relevance side
of the scale and tipped it in favor of the admission of probative
evidence.120

When in genuine doubt, therefore, a federal court should refuse
to create a new privilege or to expand an existing one.

III.

AN ASSESSMENT OF JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONTENTION THAT UNDER
RULE 501, THE FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE A
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE EXTENDING TO CONSULTATIONS
WITH LICENSED CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKERS

After establishing his apprehension toward new privileges, Justice Scalia concluded that the majority in Jaffee erred both in recognizing a psychotherapist privilege and in extending that privilege to consultations with licensed clinical social workers. Is this
conclusion inevitable once the validity of the general preference
is conceded? It is submitted that the answer to that question is
"no." The Jaffee majority correctly ruled that the term "experience," as used in Rule 501, counsels in favor of recognizing a

116. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
117. See id.at 588.
118. Id at 589.

119. See id.
120. See Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach, supra note 41, at 541.
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psychotherapist privilege. The majority also properly followed the
lead of "reason" under Rule 501 when it extended the privilege
to licensed clinical social workers. The majority's rulings were
justifiable exercises of the courts' power under Rule 501, and illumine the meaning of the statutory terms "experience" and
"reason."
A.

The Majority's Decision to Fashion a Psychotherapist Privilege

The validity of Justice Scalia's attack on the majority's recognition of a psychotherapist privilege turns on the meaning of the
term "experience" in Rule 501. The majority obviously attached
great weight to the fact that legislative bodies in "all 50 States
and the District of Columbia have enacted into law some form of
psychotherapist privilege."121 For his part, Justice Scalia dismissed
that fact as "irrelevant." 2 Although the majority was impressed
by "[t]he uniform judgment of the" state legislatures,12 3 Justice
Scalia regarded the uniform pattern of the state statutes as an
"irrelevance."124 In contrast, the majority twice asserted that it is
wholly "appropriate"12 5 to rely on state statutes as experience
warranting the creation of an evidentiary privilege.
Determining the meaning of the term "experience" by looking
to state statutes and other sources, as the majority did, reflects a
sounder interpretation of Rule 501. Indeed, just as Justice Scalia
understated the case for the general policy bias against recognizing new privileges, Justice Stevens understated the case for the
conclusion that the term "experience" in Rule 501 specifically
contemplates legislative experience. In his attempt to rebut the
dissent's argument, Justice Stevens simply asserted, "Although
common-law rulings may once have been the primary source of
new developments in federal privilege law, that is no longer ,the
case."1 26 Closer scrutiny, which the issue surely deserves, reveals
that both policy considerations and maxims of statutory construction bolster the majority's ruling.
Many exclusionary rules of evidence rest on institutional rationales; that is, on justifications that serve a policy of ensuring effi121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (1996).
Id. at 1938 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1930.
Id. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1929-30.
Id. at 1930.
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cient functioning of the courts as mechanisms for accurate resolution of disputes. 27 Rule 403 is a case in point. That rule allows
the trial judge to exclude relevant evidence when the judge concludes that the admission of the evidence would tempt the jury
to decide the case on an emotional basis.1 2 In this situation, the
129
introduction of the evidence might trigger an inferential error,
which could result in an inaccurate verdict. Rule 403 empowers
the judge to shield the court from that risk. The best evidence
and hearsay rules, contained in Articles X and VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence, fit the same pattern. As particular applications of a broader best evidence principle, 130 these doctrines
give the litigants incentives to produce more trustworthy types of
evidence; for instance, the document itself rather than a paraphrase, or the witness herself rather than a description of what
she said outside of court. The hope is that the presentation of
more reliable species of evidence will yield more accurate
verdicts.
Privileges do not fit neatly in this pattern. As previously stated,
the Jaffee majority largely ignored the humanistic rationale advanced by the Seventh Circuit and focused instead on the instrumental justification. If the stated rationale for recognizing a privilege is the instrumental rationale that the privilege will promote
certain behavior outside of court, 13' then the pivotal question is
the impact of the evidentiary rule beyond the walls of the courthouse. On the one hand, the courts are in a superior position to
gauge the impact of an evidentiary rule on courtroom behavior,
including the conduct of the petit jurors during deliberations.
Unlike most legislators, trial judges have extensive experience interacting with petit jurors. By virtue of presiding at jury trials,
judges undeniably gain insights into the workings of the jury institution. On the other hand, little reason, if any, exists to suppose that judges are in a better position to assess the effect of an
evidentiary rule beyond the courthouse. Judges have no inherent
advantage in determining whether shaping a privilege rule in a
particular fashion will significantly enhance the freedom of inter127. AN EVIDENCE ANTHOLOGY 132, 189 (Edward J. Imwinkelried & Glen Weissenberger eds., 1996) [hereinafter ANTHOLOGY].
128. See generally Victor J. Gold; LimitingJudicial Discretion to Exclude PrejudicialEvidence, 18 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 59 (1984).
129. See id. at 68.
130. See generally Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOwA L. REV. 227
(1988).
131. See ANTHOLOGY, supra note 127, at 132, 155, 188-89.
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action between a psychotherapist and a patient miles from the
courthouse. Because the legislature has the plenary power to enact statutes regulating that interaction, it would appear that a
legislative body is in at least as strong a position as a court to
evaluate whether a proposed privilege rule is likely to achieve a
certain, desired effect outside of court. Thus, the stated policy
underlying Rule 501 is served by consideration not only of judicial, but also of legislative, experience.
In addition to this strong policy argument, potent statutory
construction arguments also justify the weight the Jaffee majority
placed on state statutes recognizing a psychotherapeutic privilege. Justice Scalia seemed to argue that, in applying Rule 501,
the federal courts should assign great, if not dispositive, significance to the "judicial treatment" of a claimed privilege. 132 He
summarily dismissed the legislative experience as an "irrelevance." 133 In effect, he read Rule 501 as if the adjective "judicial"
preceded the noun "experience." Proper construction of Rule
501, however, first by comparing it to other rules, and second, by
examining the origins of its text, prohibits interpolation of that
adjective.
When the drafters wanted to insert the adjective "judicial" to
limit a concept in the Federal Rules of Evidence, they did so explicitly. Rule 201, governing judicial notice, is a perfect example.
The tide of Article 11,134 the title of Rule 201, and the rule's text
all expressly incorporate the adjective "judicial."135 The adjective
appears a total of six times in five subdivisions of Rule 201,136
and the adverbial form of the term surfaces three times in two
subdivisions.1 37 Significantly, the very first paragraph of the accompanying Advisory Committee Note distinguishes between judicial notice of adjudicative and "legislative" facts.1 38 When the
drafters wanted to signal their intent to restrict a concept to its
judicial facets, they employed apt language to evince that
intent. 139
132. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. 1932, 1936, 1938 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1938 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. See FED. R. EvID. art. II.
135. See FED. R. EVID. 201.
136. See id.The word appears once in subsection (a), once in subsection (c), once
in subsection (d), twice in subsection (e), and once in subsection (f). See id.
137. See id. The word appears as an adverb once in subsection (b), and twice in
subsection (g). See id.
138. See FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory committee's note.
139. Cf FED. R. EVID. 803(22)-(23) (hearsay exceptions for certain types of
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No language exists in Rule 501 to suggest even faintly that the
drafters intended to restrict courts that interpret the statute to
the weighing of judicial experience. One of the most frequently
invoked maxims of interpretation is expressio unius"4° That canon
presumes that, when a drafter includes language in one statutory
provision but omits the language from another provision in the
same statutory scheme, the omission is intentional.1 41 As one
court has remarked, "Where Congress knows how to say something but chooses not to, its silence is controlling." 142 Rule 201
demonstrates beyond cavil that Congress knew how to limit a
concept to its judicial aspects. Because Congress did not limit
Rule 501 in that way, one is compelled to conclude that the
drafters used the term "experience" in the broad sense, including experience with legislation.
The genesis of the language of Rule 501 supports the same
conclusion. As previously stated, the language often is traced to
the Court's 1930s decisions in Funk v. United States 43 and Wofle v.

United States.14 The Funk decision itself, however, tracks the language back further to the Court's 1892 decision in Benson v.
United States.14 In Benson, the government called as a witness a
codefendant whose trial had been severed from that of another
defendant. Precedent, grounded on the common law of 1789,
appeared to require the court to declare the codefendant was incompetent.146 The Court, however, did not consider itself "precluded by that [precedent] from examining this question in the
light of . . . sound reason."1 47 Traditional reasons for holding

judgments).
140. See B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 517 (2d Cir. 1996). See generaly Clifton Williams, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alteaius, 15 MARQ L. Rav. 191 (1931).

141. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994); Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983); Oregon Natural Resources Council, Inc. v. Kantor, 99 F.3d
334, 339 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Espinoza-Leon, 873 F.2d 743, 746 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989);
Timken Co. v. United States, 858 F. Supp. 206, 212 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994); Donovan v.
United States, 807,. Supp. 560, 566 (D.S.D. 1992), affd sub nom. Donovan v. Farmer's
Home Admin., 807 F Supp. 560, 566 (D.S.D. 1992); B.E Goodrich Co. v. United States,
794 F. Supp. 1148, 1153 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992); Miller v. Carlson, 768 F. Supp. 1331, 133536 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
142. In re Haas, 48 F.3d 1153, 1156 (l1th Cir. 1995).
143. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
144. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
145. 146 U.S. 325 (1892); see also Funk, 290 U.S. at 375-77.
146. See United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).
147. Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335 (1892).
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such a witness incompetent were no longer deemed sound.148
The Court supported this conclusion by citing a trend toward a
rule against incompetency.1 49 Legislative, as well as judicial, developments marked the trend; indeed, in the Court's view, state legislation had "controlled the decisions of the courts . ..

."150

As it had in Benson, the Funk Court relied upon "general authority" and "sound reason"-"upon the trend of congressional
opinion and of legislation (that is to say of legislation generally),
and upon the great weight of judicial authority .... "-151 Reviewing the early, common-law rule that a spouse was incompetent to
testify for an accused spouse, the Court determined that contemporary uses of the terms "reason" and "experience" required
abandonment. 52 A current of modern state legislation, present
in "most," but not all, states, 1 3 helped persuade the Court that
t
the early view conflicted with contemporary "public policy." 5
Paraphrasing Funk one year later in Woflfe, the Court wrote
that evidentiary rules are "governed by common-law principles as
interpreted and applied by the federal courts in the light of reason and experience." 155 Thus, the examination of general authority had evolved into an assessment of "experience," including, in
56
Wolfle, state court privilege rulings predicated on state statutes.

Congress endorsed inclusion of state legislation as part of "experience" when it enacted Rule 501, the text of which recites almost verbatim the passage in Wfle. The Jaffee majority's look at
state legislative trends in its assessment of experience fell
squarely within its own, congressionally approved, precedent.

148. See id. at 335-36.
149. See id. at 337.
150. Id. A quarter-century later, in another case abrogating an ancient incompetency rule, the Court again followed Benson's inquiry into "sound reason" and "general
authority." See Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918). With regard to "sound reason," the Court balanced the old reasons against a modem concern, "the conviction of
our time that the truth is more likely to be arrived at" by hearing all percipient witnesses and leaving to the jury the question of how much weight to give their testimony.
Id. at 471. As to "general authority," the Court in Rosen, as it had in Benson, cited trends
in both courts and legislatures. See id.

151. Funk, 290 U.S. at 380.
152. See id. at 381-85.
153. See id. at 376.
154. See id.
155. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934).
156. See id. (citing Linnell v. Linnell, 143 N.E. 813, 814 (Mass. 1924); State v. Young,
117 A. 713, 715 (N.J. 1922); O'Toole v. Ohio German Fire Ins. Co., 123 N.W. 795, 797
(Mich. 1909); Wickes v. Walden, 81 N.E. 798, 804 (Il. 1907)).
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In sum, Justice Scalia erred in seeking to limit the concept of
"experience" in Rule 501 to judicial experience. At least when
the stated justification for a privilege is instrumental, the crucial
issue is the likely impact of the evidentiary rule on behavior
outside of the courtroom. A legislative body is at least as well
poised to forecast that impact as the judiciary. Further, it is unsound to interpret Rule 501 as if the term "judicial" preceded
the term "experience." Rule 501 omits that adjective, and the
drafters' use of that very adjective in other provisions in the
Rules indicates that the omission was purposeful. Broadly construing Rule 501, so that it encompasses legislative as well as
other experience, also holds truer to Funk and other opinions
from which the wording of Rule 501 derives.
B.

The Majority's Decision to Extend the Psychotherapist Privilege to
Patients' Consultations with Licensed Clinical Social Workers

If the therapist in Jaffee had been a psychiatrist or psychologist,
the majority's landmark enunciation of the existence of an uncodified, absolute psychotherapist privilege would have disposed
of the case. However, because Officer Redmond's therapist was a
licensed clinical social worker, the majority confronted the task
15 7
of sketching at least the "contours" of its creation.
As previously stated, the majority included clinical social workers within the parameters of the psychotherapist privilege; indeed, it professed "no hesitation" in so doing. 58 Citing a study
by the United States Department of Health and Human Services,
the majority stated that social workers now "provide a significant
amount of mental health treatment." 5 9 The majority emphasized
that social workers' mental health clientele "often include the
poor and those of modest means who could not afford the assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist." 16°
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, assailed the
majority's ruling that the privilege encompasses consultations
with social workers. 61 Justice Scalia criticized the majority opinion for focusing only on the similarities between social workers
and other mental health professionals, while penning "not a
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Jaffee, 116 S. CL 1932.
Id. at 1931.
Id.
Id
See id. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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word about *the respects in which they are different." 162 Justice
Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice, proceeded to detail two differences. First, Justice Scalia highlighted the difference in education
and training between the two groups. 163 Review of statutory licensing requirements for clinical social workers engaged in
mental health counseling' 64 convinced the dissenters that social
workers lack the "greatly heightened degree of skill" psychiatrists
and psychologists possess.1 65 Even a licensed social worker's training was not deemed "comparable in its rigor... or precision." 166
Second, Justice Scalia underscored that, although psychiatrists
and psychologists "do nothing but psychotherapy," 167 social workers do not confine their practice to psychotherapy; rather, they
"interview people for a multitude of reasons.'

68

Given that dif-

ference, to apply the privilege fashioned by the majority, a trial
judge will have "to determine whether the information provided
to the social worker was provided to him in his capacity as a psychotherapist"' 69-a determination unnecessary in the case of psychiatrists and psychologists. Consequently, Justice Scalia reasoned, it will be more difficult for trial judges to administer the
majority's privilege than it would be to apply a privilege confined
to psychiatrists and psychologists.
Justice Scalia correctly faulted the majority's analysis for being
incomplete because it neglects the significant differences between the two groups of mental health therapists. Moreover, Justice Scalia argued persuasively that it would be constitutional to
restrict any privilege to psychiatrists and psychologists. Assume
that the Illinois legislature had enacted a statute with that narrow scope. Suppose further that a social worker rendering therapy or one of the social worker's clients challenged the statute as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause. In most cases, when a
court assesses the validity of legislation under the equal protection guarantee, the court applies the rational basis test. 170 The
crucial question is whether the classification is rationally related

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 1937 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1937-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1938 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTrrUTiONAL LAW § 14.1-.3 (5th ed. 1995).
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to a legitimate state policy. If there is such a relation, the statutory classification passes muster.
It is true that, in some instances, the Supreme Court scrutinizes the classification more closely,17 1 sometimes even subjecting
the classification to strict scrutiny.7 2 Strict scrutiny is ordinarily
reserved for cases in which the classification impinges upon a
fundamental right,17 3 such as the right to vote, 174 or in which the
very basis of the classification is a suspect factor, such as race.175
Our hypothetical Illinois statute would not trigger strict scrutiny.
No fundamental right exists to medical services in general1 76 or
to mental health therapy in particular.17 7 Further, although there
is some contrary authority, 178 the clear "weight of authority" 7 9 is
that poverty is not a suspect basis of classification. 80 Therefore,
the rational basis test would control the constitutionality of the
Illinois statute, and Justice Scalia's arguments would be telling.
The differences with which Justice Scalia would justify differential
treatment of the two groups of mental therapists also would suffice to validate the statute under the Equal Protection Clause.
If Jaffee had posed the question whether the United States
Constitution permitted restricting the privilege to psychiatrists
and psychologists, Justice Scalia's identification of significant differences between the two groups of therapists would have been
dispositive. Constitutionality was not the question, however. Like
171. Id. § 14.3.
172. See id.
173. See McLain v. Meier, 496 F. Supp. 462, 466 (D.N.D.), affd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980).
174. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
175. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
176. See Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 1996).
177. See Noyes v. Moyer, 829 F. Supp. 9, 13 (D.N.H. 1993); Woe v. Cuomo, 559 F.
Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd in part and rev'd in part, 729 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.
1984).
178. See Nieves v. University of Puerto Rico, 7 F.3d 270, 275 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding
poverty to be a suspect class under the Puerto Rican, but not the U.S. Constitution);
Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 952 (Cal.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v.
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977); Washakie Co. School Dist. No. One v.
Herschler, 606P.2d 310, 374 (Wyo. 1980).
179. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 98 (Ark. 1983) (Adkisson,
C.J., Dissenting).
180. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Hassan v.
Wright, 45 F.3d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 1995); Dotson v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 571, 580 (7th Cir.
1993); Hogan v. Russ, 890 F. Supp. 146, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); Johnson v. Dept. of Pub.
Safety & Corr. Services, 885 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Md. 1995); Oaks v. District Court, 631
F. Supp. 538, 545 (D.R.I. 1986); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 39 N.E.2d 359, 365 (1982);
Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1144 (Okla. 1987).
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the question about the existence of a psychotherapist privilege,
the question about the scope of the privilege is a question of interpretation of a statute, Rule 501. Once again, examination of
Rule 501 in its statutory context and in light of its origins will aid
interpretation.
Nothing in the text of Rule 501 either requires or invites
courts fashioning a new privilege to limit its scope to the extent
that the Constitution compels. Other statutes within the Federal
Rules of Evidence-Rules 402 and 412 in particular-include
such limitations. On its face, Rule 402 differentiates between various categories of exclusionary rules of evidence. Rule 402 distinguishes exclusionary rules "provided by the Constitution" from
those "provided . . . by these rules," including, of course, Rule
501.81 Rule 412, the rape shield statute, is even more instructive.182 Subdivision (a) states the general rule excluding evidence
of a complainant's sexual history.18 3 Subdivision (b)(1) then enu18 4
merates three exceptions to the general rule in criminal cases.
Subdivision (b) (1) (C) codifies an exception for "evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the
defendant." 8 s Thus, under Rule 412, courts are required to limit
the scope of the exclusionary rule to the extent constitutionally
permissible. By omitting any similar directive in Rule 501, Congress permitted courts shaping a new privilege to extend their
reach beyond constitutional minima. Courts are to be guided, according to the rule, by "reason and experience."
Just as "experience," both judicial and legislative, militates in
favor of a psychotherapist privilege, "reason," construed in light
of that term's origins, favors extension of that privilege to consultations with social workers. Since the Benson opinion in 1892, the
Court has deemed itself free to change the law of privilege if
contemporary reasons warranted change.'8 6 Likewise, in 1933, the
Funk Court, using language reminiscent of Lord Coke, highlighted judicial latitude to follow the lead of "reason" in
"adapt[ing]" evidentiary principles.18 7 Lower courts, it instructed,
should develop evidentiary doctrines "suited to . . . the genius,

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See FED. R EvID. 402.
See FED. R. EVID. 412.
See FED. R. EvID. 412(a).
See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
FED. R EviD. 412(b)(1)(C).
See Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335 (1892).
See Funk, 290 U.S. at 384.
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spirit, and objects of American institutions .... ,,"88 This approach has also survived passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Trammel v. United States, issued nearly a century after
Benson, the Court found both ancient and recent reasons for a
common-law privilege to be unsound and, following "reason and
experience" as required by Rule 501, fashioned an evidentiary
doctrine appropriate to the times.18 9
In extending the psychotherapist privilege to clinical social
workers, the Jaffee majority properly exercised its statutorily delegated power to design privilege rules compatible with the distinctive "spirit ... of American institutions."1 90 Its extension serves a

core characteristic of American institutions: a commitment to legal equality, one that predates and transcends the Equal Protection Clause. As early as the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson proclaimed equality a "self-evident" truth.1 91 The principle of
equality, he wrote in a letter to Washington, is the "foundation"
of the Constitution. 1 9 Similarly, Alexander Hamilton declared in
an address at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 that
"[t]here can be no truer principle than this-that every individual of the community at large has an equal right to the protection of government." 193 Even the great French historian de Tocqueville identified "a passion for equality" as one of America's
188. Id.
189. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). The Court first concluded

that the original reasons barring one spouse from testifying against another-that a wife
is her husband's chattel, with no independent legal identity-no longer were valid. See
id. at 52. The contemporary reason-preservation of the marital relationship-did not
override the need for the witness's testimony. See id. at 52-53. This latter conclusion directly contradicted a recent declaration that the contemporary reason "has never been
unreasonable and is not now." Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958). Nonetheless, the Court in Trammel concluded that the dictates of reason and experience, as
assessed in 1980, authorized a new privilege rule; accordingly, it overruled Hawkins. See
Tramme 445 U.S. at 53.
190. See Funk, 290 U.S. at 384. When the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted,
those institutions seemed unready to embrace the psychotherapeutic privilege that the
majority adopted in Jaffee See Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974) (comments of Rep.
William Hungate, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Committee) ("It has been the effort of the committee to draw this bill so that the
law of privileges is left where we found it. This meets the major complaint. People did
not like the changes being made; when you open this up, the social workers and the piano tuners want a privilege. It is a very difficult matter, so we left that where it is for
now.").
191. HENRY DAVIDOFF, THE POCKET BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 80 (1959).
192. POLITICAL QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF NOTABLE SAYINGS ON POLITICS FROM
ANTIQUrrY THROUGH 1989 46 (Daniel B. Baker, ed., 1990):

193. Id.
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foremost institutional traits. 19
That passion surfaces in critiques of American evidence law.
For years, one of the leading contemporary evidence commentators, Professor Kenneth Graham, Jr., has contended that the primary failing of the Federal Rules of Evidence is that they subvert
the principle of legal equality. In his 1973 letter to the House
subcommittee considering the draft evidence rules, Professor
Graham charged that the draft was "shockingly unfair."195 As an
example of the unfairness, Professor Graham pointed to Rule
803(6), which sets out the business entry hearsay exception. 196
This rule, he wrote, represents "a special privilege" for wealthy
"businessmen." 197 Its wording permits a bank to invoke the exception to justify introducing its computer printouts against an
individual defendant. It did not appear broad enough, however,
to allow the individual to introduce his or her check stubs
against the bank. 198 Provisions such as draft Rule 803(6) led Professor Graham to conclude that the Rules were the handiwork of
"an oligarchy of rich .. .lawyers who make rules to suit their
powerful clients . . . 99
After the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Professor
Graham reiterated this theme in his oft-cited treatise on the evidence rules. He voiced the fear that the courts would slight the
principle of legal equality as they evolved privilege doctrine pursuant to Rule 501.2 0 Professor Graham was concerned that courts
would structure privilege rules to shield "professions that primarily serve a monied clientele . . .-- doctors, lawyers, and psychiatrists"2 01-while denying protection to "professions that serve
analogous functions for working class people ..
202He specifically stated that, given the similarity of their professional functions, it would be inconsistent with the principle of legal equality
to cover psychiatrists but to exclude social workers. 2 3 Professor
194. POLITICAL QUOTATIONS: A WORLDWIDE DICTIONARY. OF THOUGHTS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS FROM POLITICIANS, LITERARY FIGURES, HUMORISTS AND OTHERS 51 (Michael C.
Thomsett & Jean F. Thomsett, eds., 1994).
195, See PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE (Supp.), HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong. 202 (1973).
196. See id. at 204.
197. Id.
198. See id.

199. Id. at 205.
200. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 94, § 5422, at 675-76 (1980).

201. Id. at 676.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 676 n.52.
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courts had neglected the
Graham complained that, to date, 2the
4
privilege needs of "the poor man."

0

The Jaffee decision represents a belated response to Graham's
complaint. Echoing Graham, Justice Stevens justified extending
the privilege on the ground that social workers' "clients often include the poor and those of modest means who could not afford
the assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist,
but whose counsel20 5
ing sessions serve the same public goals."

If the psychotherapy privilege had been limited to psychiatrists
and psychologists, it would have offended the principle of legal
equality. The poor and the members of the working class and
middle class have at least as great a need for mental health therapy as the wealthy. A 1973 article, cited by the Seventh Circuit,
states that the incidence of mental illness is highest in lowincome groups.2'0 As early as the 1930s, researchers detected indications of a higher rate of schizophrenia among the poor.2 °7
The most recent research, sponsored by the National Institute of
Mental Health, confirms those indications. These data indicate
that the odds of finding a schizophrenic disorder in the lowest
socioeconomic status group are 8.1 times higher than that for
the highest group. For severe cognitive impairment, the odds are
11.5 times greater.2 8 Observing that other studies had found that
the incidence of hysterical neurosis2 9 and sociopathy210 also is
highest among the poor, these researchers stated that, overall,
"the odds of individuals in the lowest socioeconomic status
group having a disorder is about 2.5 times that of individuals in
the highest group." 21' They concluded that "there is no question
that the burden of mental disorders . . .rests disproportionately
212
on those with the least ability to meet their costs."

204. See id. at 676.

205. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931 (citation omitted).
206. See Richard Delgado, Comment, Underprivileged Communications: Extension of the
Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 CAL L REv. 1050,
1051 (1973); see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1358 n.19 (7th Cir. 1995), affd,
116 S. CL 1923 (1996).
207. See D.A. Regier et al., One-Month Prevalence of Mental Disorders in the United States
and Sociodemographic Characteristics: The Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study, 88 ACTA
PSCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 35, 44 (1993).
208. See id. at 44-45; see also DONALD W. GOODWIN & SAMUEL B. GUZE, PSYCHIATRIC DiAGNOSIS 46 (5th ed. 1996).

209. See id. at 111.
210. See id. at 258.
211. Regier et al., supra note 207, at 44.
212. Id. at 45. Accord 25 WRIGHT & GiRAAM, supra note 94, § 5525, at 177 (citing
study finding that psychiatrists and psychologists "treated only 16% of those receiving
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Despite their fragmentary nature, these data point to the same
conclusion that common sense suggests. Mental illness can be a
product of prolonged, intense psychological pressure; in some
respects, the poor are more exposed to this pressure. Desperate
financial need can be a source of pressure; as a class, the poor
are more vulnerable to that pressure than other economic strata.
Because they cannot afford better housing, many of the poor reside in "crime ridden" areas with high homicide rates213-an ex21 4
istence that itself can be "stressful."
Although the need may be superior, both the quantity and
quality of mental health counseling available to the poor is inferior to that available to the well-to-do. As the Seventh Circuit observed, the professional services of psychiatrists and psychologists
can be "costly" 215 and, consequently, beyond the reach of the
poor. 16 As a practical matter, the poor have effective access only
to psychiatric social workers. 217 In addition, as the Jaffee dissenters
stated, the social workers to whom the poor have access have less
expertise in treating mental illness than psychiatrists and psychologists. 218 To make matters worse, members of the lower economic
strata are often more distrustful of authority figures and may be
less willing to divulge relevant information to the mental health
therapist without an assurance of confidentiality.2 9 Thus, the instrumental justification advanced by both the Seventh Circuit
and the Jaffee majority-promotion of candid communications
between patient and psychotherapist-arguably applies more to
the clients of social workers than to those of private psychiatrists
and psychologists.
These problems are largely a product of the market mechanisms for distributing mental health services. The simple truth is
that many people cannot afford the services of well-trained psytreatment for mental illness, whereas social workers treated 18%, nurses 29%, and other
unlicensed professionals took care of 26% of the patients. Moreover, nearly 50% of
those suffering from mental illness have incomes below the poverty level and could
hardly afford to patronize those who serve the country club crowd."); cf. Richard A.
Shweder, It's Called PoorHealth for a Reason, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 9, 1997, at E5 (reciting British statistics showing that lower classes suffer more from mental illness than upper
classes).
213. SeeJaffee, 51 F.3d at 1355.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 1358 n.19.
216. See Delgado, supra note 206, at 1054-55.
217. See id. at 1050, 1054, 1063; see alsoJaffee, 51 F.3d at 1358 n.19.
218. SeeJaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1937-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219. See Delgado, supra note 206, at 1053, 1068.
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chiatrists and psychologists. Quoting the 1973 article that revealed the high incidence of mental illness among the lower classes,220 the Seventh Circuit described clinical social workers as the
"poor man's psychiatrist."221 The facts of Jaffee demonstrate that

even fully employed people, like police officers, consult social
workers through work-sponsored programs. 222 Admittedly, society
has no constitutional duty to make the services of psychiatrists
and psychologists available to everyone at the government's expense. m Nonetheless, the government does not need to add insult to injury. The market may dictate the type of mental health
therapist a person can consult, but the law determines the kind
of evidentiary privilege, if any, that covers the consultation. The
courts should not compound inequalities by denying any evidentiary privilege to consultations with those mental health experts
whom the poor can consult. The legislature may have no affirmative constitutional duty to ensure equal access to the most thoroughly trained mental health professionals; however, for their
part, courts can grant the poor and middle class equal evidentiary protection for their mental health consultations. Rule 501,
through its forebear, the Funk line of opinions, empowers courts
to employ "reason" to contour evidentiary privileges "in harmony with the . . . spirit . . . of American institutions .

. .

.22

That spirit, which embraces a commitment to legal equality, 2M inspires the Jaffee majority's decision to extend the privilege to
clinical social workers.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In one sense, Jaffee disappoints. The Jaffee majority chose to
rely on a conventional, instrumental justification for evidentiary
privileges. Grave reason exists to doubt whether, in the long
term, the instrumental rationale will prove the firmest grounding
for privilege doctrine. A few empirical studies show the impact of
evidentiary privileges on interactions outside the courtroom. The
studies are so few in number that their findings are necessarily
220. SeeJaffee, 51 F.3d at 1358 n.19 (quoting Delgado, supra note 206, at 1050).
221. 1&

222. SeeJaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926.
223. See generally Hill 93 F.3d at 422 (stating that governments have no constitutional duty to provide emergency medical services); Noyes v. Moyer, 829 F. Supp. 9
(D.N.H. 1993); Woe, 559 F. Supp. at 1165.
224. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 384 (1933).
225. See supra notes 190-225 and accompanying text.
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tentative; however, those findings tend to suggest that the courts
and commentators have overestimated the impact of privileges
on the willingness to communicate with professionals such as attorneys and psychotherapists. 26 If additional research yields the
same finding, courts wishing to continue cloaking certain relationships in an evidentiary privilege may need to depreciate the
instrumental justification and to consider the humanistic rationale more seriously. In its opinion in Jaffee, the Seventh Circuit
articulated the latter rationale 227 and gave the Supreme Court an
opportunity to express its own view of the viability of a humanistic rationale for evidentiary privileges. Unfortunately, in the Supreme Court, neither the majority nor the dissenters seized that
opportunity.
In another sense, however, Jaffee pleases. Although Jaffee focused on the instrumental rationale, it did so in a way that not
only reached the right results, but also gave important insight
into federal privilege doctrine. Although Rule 501 refers to "the
common law," strictly speaking, courts do not exercise commonlaw power when developing privilege doctrine. Rather, they employ a statutory power delegated by Congress. In Jaffee the Court
elucidated the proper means to construe Rule 501's central statutory terms: "reason" and "experience."
In addressing the term "experience," the Jaffee decision reaffirms that courts exercising their delegated power should look at
"experience" in a broad sense, including legislative experience.
The language of Rule 501 coalesced in the Funk-Wole line of
cases, in which the Court treated state legislation as "experience"
justifying reform of an evidentiary rule. 228 Following that line of

cases, the majority in Jaffee considered the "uniform" 229 pattern
of the state legislation impressive enough to warrant the decision
to create a federal psychotherapist privilege. Jaffee thus attests
that, if the question is, for example, whether there is a need for
a psychotherapist privilege, it is perfectly proper for a court to
consider state legislation on the subject.
In addressing the term "reason," the majority in Jaffee further
endorsed the approach established in the earlier opinions. In

226. See generally Daniel W. Schuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Em-

pirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 60 N.C. L. REv. 893 (1982); Fred
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REv 351 (1989).
227. SeeJaffee, 51 F.3d at 1356.
228. See supra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
229. SeeJaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930.
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Funk, the Court, elaborating on the role of "reason" in formulating evidentiary doctrine, made clear that judges are both permitted and encouraged to adapt evidentiary norms to "changed" social conditions to keep -those norms consistent with the "spirit
• . . of American institutions ....

"230

In Jaffee, the majority ac-

knowledged a profound social change: "Today, social workers
provide a significant amount of mental health treatment." 23 1 Its

decision to extend the privilege to social workers adapted privilege doctrine to that change. Moreover, it did this in a manner
wholly consistent with the commitment to legal equality that is
characteristic of American institutions. Concededly, it would not
have been unconstitutional to promulgate a psychotherapist privilege denying any protection to patients who consult clinical
workers. Drawing the line there, however, would have been an illiberal affront to the principle of legal equality.

230. Funk, 290 U.S. at 381-85.
231. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931. The Court seconded a conclusion of the appellate
court. SeeJaffee, 51 .3d at 1355.

